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FAULT OF THE VICTIM: THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY UNDER
CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 2317, 2318, AND 2321
In 1974 and 1975, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-examined three
tort articles' which have been part of the Louisiana Civil Code in their
present form for over 150 years and found within them the basis for a
type of strict liability predicated on non-negligent fault. 2 In each case
the court reached its results through painstaking elucidation of the statutory meaning and legislative intent at the time of enactment, in the process overturning jurisprudence of long standing. Further, the justices
found this intent in harmony with the needs and realities of Louisiana
society 3 in the late twentieth century and therefore justified their holding
on the basis of prevailing policy notions as well as faithful and accurate
statutory construction.
In Holland v. Buckley,4 article 23215 was construed to provide liability based on a presumption of fault for animal owners when their animals cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In Turner P.

Bucher,6 an old jurisprudential rule 7 construing article 23188 was rein1. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2317, 2318, and 2321.
2. The results were foreshadowed by the 1971 decision in Langlois v.Allied Chem.,
258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971), which held that violation of Civil Code article 669
constituted fault under article 2315 sufficient to hold the defendant liable even absent proof
of negligence.
3. The perception of congruence between the legislative intent and modem needs
was acknowledged in Holland . Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974), as follows: "[T]he
ancient intention best serves modem needs. In the crowded society of today, the burden of
harms caused by an animal should be borne by his master who keeps him for his own
pleasure or use rather than by an innocent victim injured by the animal." Id. at 120. The
view is implicit in Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975), where the court recognized
that innocent victims should not go uncompensated when there is a source of financial
responsibility, 308 So. 2d at 276, and in Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975), where
the court reasoned that liability should attach to the person to whom society allots the care
or guardianship of the risk-creating person or thing. 324 So. 2d at 446.
4. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974) (summarized in Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 446
(La. 1975)).
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2321 states:

The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage he has caused; but if the animal
had been lost, or had strayed more than a day, he may discharge himself from this
responsibility, by abandoning him to the person who has sustained the injury; except
where the master has turned loose a dangerous or noxious animal, for then he must
pay for all the harm done, without being allowed to make the abandonment.
6. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
7. Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885).
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2318 states: "The father, or after his decease, the mother, are
responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing
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stated through a similar presumption of fault to extend the liability of
parents for the damage occasioned by their minor children to those acts
which do not constitute fault on the part of the child. In Loescher v.
Parr,9 the owner or possessor of a thing which by its defect caused harm
to another was again presumed at fault and hence liable through application of Civil Code article 2317.10 In each case the liability imposed was
termed a type of strict liability; consequently, the lack of personal negligence was not a defense.
The new-found presumptions of fault rely on almost identical mechanisms: each requires a finding of (1) a defect in a thing or a deficiency in
the conduct of a person or animal and (2) defendant's duty of guard
based on a custodial relationship to the deficient entity. The existence of
a defect or deficiency in conduct is evidently to be measured by a standard of "creation of unreasonable risk of harm."" In effect, the responsible individual has a duty to have such guard 12 over the person or thing
with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse
against those persons. The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors."
9. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317 states: "We are responsible, not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we
are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. This, however, is to be
understood with the following modifications."
While article 2317 was the last of the three to be interpreted as a basis for strict liability, it is actually the broadest article and encompasses within its meaning the specific applications of articles 2318 and 2321 which the court addressed in Hollandand Turner. For
many years the broad language of article 2317 has been viewed as merely introductory to
the "modifications" stated in articles 2318 through 2322, and as therefore having no independent force. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937); Arrington v. Hearin
Tank Lines, 805 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 450
(La. 1975) (Marcus, J., dissenting). The Loescher ruling is noteworthy not only for its
strict liability holding, but also because it established article 2317 as a provision having
content and effect beyond the particularizations treated in the five following articles.
Loescher indicates that articles 2318 through 2322 define the applications of the general
principle of 2317 within their respective ambits but do not exhaust the scope of the general
article. Earlier signs that a new reading of article 2317 would be forthcoming are discussed in Note, The "Discovery" of Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234 (1976).
11. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 446 (La. 1975). Andrus, Strict Liability Under
Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318, and 2321, An Initial Analysis, 25 LA. B.J. 105, 110, 112
(1977).
12. The word "guard" is used here to indicate the duty of one who has care or custody. It should be noted that the word "guard" in these strict liability opinions has two
related, but separable, meanings. The first meaning is the one noted above. Guard is also
used to refer to the fact that a person or thing is under one's care or custody, since the
concept of custody comes from a translation of the French "garde." The Loescher opinion
quoted Verlander, We are Responsible.. , 2 TUL. Civ. L.F., No. 2, 64 (1974), as suggesting: "IT]he things in one's care are those things to which one bears such a relationship
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as to prevent it from causing an unreasonable risk of injury to others.
The liability imposed by each article is not absolute but is subject to
limited defenses which are enumerated in the opinions. Each presumption can be defeated by a finding that the harm was caused by the victim's fault, a third person's fault or an irresistible force.' 3 The limits of
these defenses are nowhere enunciated in the Holland, Turner, and
Loescher decisions and have yet to be developed by the state's highest
court. Since lack of negligence has been eliminated as an effective escape from liability, the enumerated defenses assume particular importance.
Victim fault will likely be the most often attempted means of exculpation raised by the strict liability defendant, since fortuitous events will
seldom be factually available and third parties will likewise not always
be implicated. This comment will attempt to discern the probable bases
of this defense, as they can be inferred from the reasoning of the supreme
court in these strict liability decisions, and as they have been announced
in later decisions of the circuit courts of appeal.
Supreme Court Language on the Victim Fault Defense
The supreme court stated clearly that the strict liability imposed by
these articles rests on a decision regarding the proper allocation of risks
in society-a decision that risks should shift from an innocent victim to
one who has guard over and derives the benefit from the person or thing
causing damage. 14 It is also clear from the opinions that for victim fault
to prevail as a defense, some conduct of the victim must substantially,' 5
though certainly not solely, contribute to his injury. Thus, a non-innocent victim might still recover if his fault did not actually cause his injury. Likewise, of course, an innocent victim might not recover if he were
unable to prove some element of his strict liability action-e.g., unreaas to have the right of direction and control over them. This relationship will ordinarily be
associated with ownership, but the guardianship will also belong to the bailee, the lessee,
the usufructuary, the borrower for use and the repairman, among others.
324 So. 2d
at 449 n.7.
13. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 447 (La. 1975).
14. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d at 446; Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d at 155; Holland
v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d at 120.
15. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 449 (La. 1975). It may be noted that Loescher
dealt briefly with the third defense of irresistible force. It appears that'such force must be
more than a substantial factor: "The wind was not, for instance, of hurricane force, so as to
permit its being classified as a reasonably unforeseeable violent manifestation of nature
causing the damage independent of any defect of the tree, since a healthy tree as well as a
diseased one might be overblown." 324 So. 2d at 449 (emphasis added).
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sonable risk of harm, or causation by the defect or deficient conduct.
The three opinions provide only this skeletal image of the defense-that
it must include a coincidence of causation and behavior definable as
fault-and have left the corpus to be added by the clarification of reasoning and policy by courts in subsequent litigation.
The brevity of the court's treatment of the defense also leaves unarticulated the reasons for allowing the three particular limitations on strict
liability. Why exclude liability in instances of victim fault? The answer
is probably not simply the operation of a clean hands doctrine, since the
opinions evidently require the victim's fault-infected behavior to be substantially causative. Although couched as a defense, the finding of exculpating victim fault functions as a determination that the risk
presented was not "unreasonable."
The General Concept of Fault
Before assessing the status of the victim fault defense three years
and a handful of cases after the three landmark decisions, it is helpful to
examine the concept of fault in its present configuration in Louisiana
jurisprudence and doctrine. As Ferdinand Stone discusses fault in his
treatise on Louisiana tort doctrine, 16 it has traditionally included the notions of unlawful conduct, intentional causing of harm, and negligence.
There is extensive jurisprudence indicating that liability attaches for
each of these types of fault. Additionally, there is the form of liability
which ensues through application of a standard from the Civil Code or
other positive law in cases such as those here discussed, which is sometimes referred to as liability without fault. 1 7 The reasoning of the court,
however, has kept this type of liability within the fault-based framework
by applying a presumption of fault when certain factual requisites are
met. These legal developments are better viewed as emancipating the
fault concept from the strictures of moral blameworthiness, rather than
as imposing liability without fault.' 8 Fault, for modem tort law purposes, must be seen as a social rather than a moral concept; fault can be
found whenever one acts as he pught not to, according to some societal
standard.19 The concept is not amenable to a general definition, though
16. F. STONE, LA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT DOCTRINE, §§ 59-61 (1977).

17. Id. at § 61.
18. Stone, Touchstone of Tort Liability, 2 STAN. L. REV. 259, 283 (1950).
19. See Justice Barham's discussion of fault in Langlois v. Allied Chem., 258 La. 1067,
1076, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (1971), citing the French jurists, Colin and Capitfint. 2 COLIN ET
CAPIT;NT, COURS tLEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAISE § 190 (8th ed. 1935). See
also Stone, Tort Doctrinein Louisiana,27 TUL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1952), where it is noted that:

19781

COMMENTS

it is possible to categorize various ways in which it may arise-as for
example, through intentional misconduct, negligence, or failure to prevent harm caused by a thing in one's custody. All conduct which falls
within these categories will not be liability-attaching fault for all times
and purposes.20 The final determination of where the cost of a risk must
lie is made by the courts in light of the manner in which each factual
situation poses the interests and conduct of the parties as they relate to
societal interests and standards of conduct.
Victim Fault. Traditionaland Possible Bases
The defense of victim fault, not so-called but as manifested in several precise defenses, has long been a part of Louisiana law. For example, with respect to the intentional torts of battery and defamation, proof
of mutual combat and mutual vituperation will defeat the plaintiff's
cause of action. 2 1 Likewise, when the defendant is charged with negligence, proof of the plaintiff's contributory negligence will defeat recovery, unless that result is circumvented by the application of the doctrine
of last clear chance. 2 2 There appears, in fact, to be a clear pattern: the
victim will defeat his cause of action by conduct that matches the defendant's conduct in type of fault, even if not in degree.
Traditionally, the victim fault defenses have been expressed in
terms of precise doctrines, each encompassing a specific type of behavior.
The Holland, Turner, and Loescher decisions deviate from this pattern
by speaking of a broad and general defense of victim fault. The most
forthright reason for this breadth of language would be to indicate that
any form of behavior which has been held to constitute fault is a possible
basis for denying recovery.
This paper will attempt to discern whether the court intended to
promulgate such a broad standard of victim fault. To members of the
legal profession who have become comfortable with dealing with liability based on negligence, the inevitable first inquiry is whether the traditional defenses to a negligence action constitute exculpating victim fault
under these three articles. Consequently, the use of contributory negliThe experience of almost a century and a half has shown that Louisiana judges can
find in the term a sufficient mirror of the times to adjust to an age of increased industrialization. As the jurisprudence shows, the courts have not considered "fault" to be
merely moral blameworthiness; they have appreciated the fact that in this age the
concepts of economic utility and social good have come perilously close to overshadowing the concept of moral blame.
20. Langlois v. Allied Chem., 258 La. 1067, 1076, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (1971).
21. Stone, supra note 19, at 15, 16.
22. F. STONE, supra note 16, at §§ 50, 58.
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gence or assumption of risk as victim fault has received early attention
from the courts and commentators. 23 It is also logical to inquire
whether presumed fault will exonerate the strict liability defendant, a
24
possibility that has received almost no attention.
A survey of the case law to date suggests that no categorical answers
to these questions will be given by the supreme court. Although the

decisions describe the available defenses for each article in nearly identical terms, the policy relationships grounding liability under each vary.
The facts of specific cases may also warrant varying the scope of defendant's liability to include or exclude certain risks created in part by the
victim. A case by case (rather than categorical) approach is thus the
proper method for defining the boundaries of exculpating victim fault in
strict liability cases. This comment will nevertheless discuss cases in
terms of specific defense doctrines, in order to address more directly the
confusion about their potential application as victim fault.
Liabilityfor an Animal Under Article 2321

Negligence and Related Conduct
Liability under Civil Code article 2321 has been defeated by a find-

ing of victim fault in three cases, one of the earliest of which arose in the
dog bite context.25 The nine-year-old plaintiff in Dotson v. Continental
23. See, e.g., Thibo v. Aetna Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 So. 2d 674 (La. 1977); Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Fontenot v. Soileau, 336 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Andrus, supranote 1I; The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courtsfor the 1974-75 Term--Torts, 36 LA. L. REV. 400, 401
(1976); Note, The "Discovery" ofArticle 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234, 240 (1976).
24. Interestingly, an attempt was made to use a presumption of fault under one of
these codal articles as a defense in two negligence actions. In Woodward v. Firstof Georgia
Ins. Co., 333 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), the defendant was held liable for accidently shooting his friend, who was the pistol owner. One defense raised was that the
pistol was defective and therefore the plaintiff-owner was contributorily negligent in bringing it to defendant's home. While the court was not satisfied with the expert testimony
establishing a defect, it chose to assume the existence of a defect and disposed of the argument by reference to Loescher and to the fact that a third person's fault would defeat a
presumption of fault based on Civil Code article 2317. The court considered defendant's
lack of extraordinary care in handling the pistol to be fault of a third person. In Maus v.
Schouest, 342 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), the defendant injured a five-year-old
child while driving with due care. The trial judge had instructed the jury with respect to
possible contributory negligence on the part of the child. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal held the instructions to be erroneous, terming them an "overzealous" application
and interpretation of the Turner rule.
25. A fourth case in which strict liability under article 2321 was urged but not found
by the court is Alfonso v. Market Facilitiesoflouston, Inc., 356 So. 2d 86 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1978). The opinion focuses on the victim in
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Insurance Co. 26 had accompanied a friend to the home of defendant's
insured to get a puppy. The young plaintiff was bitten when he entered
a fenced yard, alone, where two adult dogs and the puppies were kept.
There was conflicting testimony as to whether the dog owner had invited
the child to enter the yard or had instructed him to wait outside. The
First Circuit overturned the trial court's finding of liability on the basis
of victim fault, but declined to characterize the precise nature of the fault
beyond noting that "Young Kinchen. . .was given specific instructions
to wait there until he could be accompanied by the owner's young son"
and that he had "reached the age of reason and should have remained on
'27
the patio as he was instructed.
Since there was no evidence in the case indicating that plaintiff had
a subjective knowledge of the risks in entering a yard with adult dogs
and puppies or a voluntary acceptance of these risks, there is probably
28
no arguable basis for founding victim fault on assumption of risk.
Further, while plaintiff's conduct might easily have been termed contributory negligence in an adult, the contributory negligence of a child is to
be measured by a special standard attuned to the age, intelligence and
experience of the individual. 29 The factual finding that the child entered the yard after having been instructed to wait outside, however, may
be sufficient to make the conduct contributory negligence and is suffidenying recovery though it does not explicitly hold that victim fault is the bar. The plaintiffs were injured while returning from a horseback trail ride offered by defendants when
lightning and thunder caused their horses to bolt and throw them. The court concluded
that the plaintiffs "were active participants in the trail ride and cannot be considered as
innocent third parties. Further, they were in control of the two horses at the time of the
accident. They are therefore not entitled to recover under the strict liability provisions of
the Code." 356 So. 2d at 89. The second sentence quoted is evidently a statement that the
harm-producing animals were under the guard of the victims rather than the defendants-a conclusion which, if warranted, is a sound basis in itself for denial of recovery. It
is not clear whether the first statement that the plaintiffs cannot be considered innocent
third parties is based on the guard notion or whether it implies some form of victim fault.
It perhaps bears some cryptic relationship to the conclusion reached later in the opinion,
during discussion of negligence as a ground for liability, that "one who voluntarily utilizes
such [recreational] facilities assumes the reasonablyforeseeable risks which are inherent in
the use thereof." Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
26. 322 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 325 So. 2d 606 (La. 1976).
27. Id. at 286. The supreme court denied writs, on the basis of a correct result on the
factual findings of the court of appeal. 325 So. 2d 606 (La. 1976).
28. But see Andrus, supra note 11, at 118.
29. See, e.g., Plauche v. Consolidated Cos., 235 La. 692, 105 So. 2d 269 (1958); Arata
v. Orleans Capitol Stores, 219 La. 1045, 55 So. 2d 239 (1951); Mitchell v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,
110 La. 630, 34 So. 714 (1903); Westerfield v. Lewis, 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891);
Freeman v. Wilcox, 303 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 630
(La. 1975).
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cient to render it fault. It is reasonable for society to expect an average
nine-year-old to respect the wishes of an adult and homeowner with regard to entrance onto part of his property, even though the child cannot
fully appreciate the adult's reason or the possible risks. It was also important that the dogs were fenced within defendant's yard, which afforded no easy access to the public. Both the deference traditionally
accorded to a property owner and the behavior-shaping function of tort
law bore upon the ruling of this case.
The defendant's liability for injuries caused by his dog was defeated
in Parker v. Hanks30 by the trial court's finding of contributory negligence. In affirming, the Third Circuit again declined to label plaintiffs
conduct more specifically than victim fault, but argued in dictum that
contributory negligence should be considered adequate proof of victim
fault. Defendant operated a small fish market on his premises, which
Mrs. Parker, arriving around 5 p.m., had found closed. The defendant's
labrador retriever bit the plaintiff as she knocked on defendant's kitchen
door to see if he had any fish for sale. The court found Mrs. Parker at
fault "inasmuch as she approached the rear of the Hanks' home unannounced, she knew a dog was customarily kept on a chain, the chain ran
she approached and, as the trial court found, she opened
under the door
'3 1
the door."
The discussion in Parker of contributory negligence as a proper
form of victim fault bears examination, for this is the only case to discuss
the issue at any length. The court noticed that Holland quoted the 1901
case of Deli~se v. Bourriague32 in which the presumption of fault against
the owner of the animal that caused damage was said to give way in the
presence of proof of "the imprudence of the one injured. '33 Judge
Stoker argued in Parker that imprudence is much like negligence, which
should therefore be considered victim fault under article 2321. He further pointed out that the animal owner can be exculpated from liability
in an article 2316 negligence action 34 by contributory negligence and
35
that the defendant under strict liability should have the same escape.
The argument has a ready appeal when it is considered that the strict
liability defendant lacks much of the moral culpability of the negligence
30. 345 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 224 (La. 1977).

31. Id. at 200. Writs were denied by the supreme court on the basis of a correct
result. 346 So. 2d 224 (La. 1977).
32. 105 La. 77, 29 So. 731 (1901).
33. Id. at 84-85, 29 So. at 734, quoted in Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d at 116.
34. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2316 states: "Every person is responsible for the damage he
occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill."
35. 345 So. 2d at 199.
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defendant. However, the very fact that will create negligence on the
part of the owner-that the dangerous nature of the animal was known
or knowable-will also generally add to the culpability of the victim.
Furthermore, contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery has been
severely criticized; 36 its harshness has inspired support for comparative
negligence as a standard of loss distribution and has led to ameliorating
doctrines in non-comparative negligence jurisdictions. 37 That a potentially unjust defense is available in one type of action hardly justifies
extending its application to another area.
In Parker,the victim fault could as easily have been called contributory negligence. It is important, though, to recognize that this does not
mean that this defense should have full and unrestricted application in
every article 2321 case. In the final analysis, the defendant whose dog
was on a chain in defendant's own home had an adequate guard over his
animal; his duty did not include anticipating the imprudent intruder.
On the other hand, the guard might not be adequate, and an imprudent
bystander might recover, if the dog were loose in the streets-simply because the balance of interests shifts. In the first situation, the interests
are much like those discussed with respect to Dotson. In the second
instance, the concern is no longer an individual's free use of his property
and there is a new and significant issue of the plaintiff's freedom to use
the public streets and walks, even in a mildly distracted state.
Assumption of Risk
In Fontenot v. Soileau,3 8 the 16-year-old plaintiff was employed as
an exercise boy for race horses and was injured when thrown by a highly
spirited animal. Young Fontenot had worked previously in the same
capacity at Evangeline Downs and had been in defendant's employ for
three months before the incident occurred. His own testimony established that the behavior of the injuring horse was not unusual and was a
risk well within the scope of the position he occupied. Thus, the factual
situation dictated a finding of a knowing and voluntary encounter with
the risk of the exact harm that occurred. Potential recovery under the
presumption of fault attributable to the horse's owner under Hollandwas
36. See, e.g., Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 116, 197 (1944);

James, Last Clear Chance.-A TransitionalDoctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938); Lowndes,
Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674 (1934).
37. See, e.g., James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Leflar, The
Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, I ARK. L. REV. 1 (1946).
38. 336 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
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therefore defeated, with assumption of risk as one of the alternate holdings.
It is evident at the outset that the assumption of risk defense does
not neatly fit the conceptual skeleton of the victim fault defense. It is
not a clearly causal defense, 39 since only in a remote way can the plaintiffs conduct be said to have caused his injury: no conduct of plaintiff
caused the horse to throw him-though, of course, the exercise of his will
three months earlier did put plaintiff in contact with the animal. Likewise, when the assumption of risk is reasonable, it is difficult to find fault
in the plaintiff. Both the elements of causation and fault are more readily seen if the situation is viewed as follows: the plaintiff, in accepting the
particular employment, was presumably aware of and competent to deal
with the risks inherent in the occupation, yet he failed adequately to handle those risks when they arose and therefore suffered injury. This failure can be viewed as causative and as fault in his conduct, just as the
defendant's non-negligent failure to prevent injury in a strict liability
context is fault. This approach is fortified by its desirability in policy
terms. One might say that the plaintiff in this situation, by his qualifications and willingness to accept the particular job, had induced defendant
to alter the nature of his guard over his animal with respect to plaintiff.
Defendant relied on plaintiffs skill, or at least on plaintiffs willing encounter with a manageable risk, in permitting contact between plaintiff
and the animal. The injury occurred, furthermore, while the victim was
pursuing his living-that is, benefit from the injuring animal had accrued to both defendant and plaintiff. In short, the defendant had not
created an "unreasonable" risk to this particular plaintiff. In balancing
interests and evaluating conduct according to societal standards, the
court can justly leave the risk where it originally fell--on the victim.
PresumedFault
In two other dog bite cases, the defendant's allegations of victim
fault failed to exonerate him from strict liability under article 2321. In
Babin v. Zurich Insurance Co. 4 the defendant was held liable for injuries caused when his dog bit three-year-old Guy Babin. Defense counsel raised the defense of victim fault since there was competent evidence
indicating that the child had pulled the dog's tail and provoked the attack. Acknowledging the child's incapacity for contributory negligence,
39. See Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.
LEG. ST. 165, 185 (1974). See also 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 174 (1), where the basis of the
defense in consent is discussed.
40. 336 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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counsel argued that, as a result of recent jurisprudence, "fault" is not
synonymous with negligence and is broader in meaning than that concept. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court judgment for the plaintiff, however, stating that "in effect, a three and one half-year-old child
can never be other than an innocent victim."'4 I The denial of application for writs significantly stated that there was no error of law in the
42
court of appeal judgment.
In Vidrine v. fhite, 43 the ten-year-old plaintiff had an I.Q. of 55 and
experienced difficulty in learning and obeying instructions. Against the
instructions of the adults who accompanied him, the child entered defendant's fenced yard in which two adult dogs were kept, and went to the
door to try to sell some canteloupes. Defendant's wife, seeing the dogs
at his heels, accompanied him back toward the gate, but the child was
bitten when he became frightened and broke away from the adult to run
for the gate. The Third Circuit upheld the jury's finding of liability because there was a reasonablebasis for the decision that contributory negligence, assumption of risk or fault on the child's part was not proven.
In discussing the matter Judge Watson noted as possible bases the boy's
lack of capacity or the possibility that his behavior did not cause his

injury.
It is significant that both of these cases involved victims with impaired capacity or total incapacity for fault. The decisions seem to rest
on this and therefore do not reach the question whether the conduct, in
one of greater discernment, would have been fault. The analysis seems
too facile (though it may have adequately responded to the arguments
briefed to the court), for it ignores the facts that (1) there are two victims
to a tort against a child--the child himself and the parent or person with
financial responsibility for him; and that (2) there is precedent for assigning fault to a parent or guardian based on conduct of a child which
would have been fault in an adult.44 Turner did not address its applicability to a parent suing for injuries to his child, though such an extension
of the holding would be logically consistent. There is no inherent unfairness in allowing a presumption of fault under the Civil Code to defeat a plaintiffs recovery in the same manner that it created defendant's
liability.4 5 In cases where these strict liability articles are factually ap41. Id. at 902.
42. 339 So. 2d 847 (La. 1976).
43. 352 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
44. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
45. Language in Turner may seem to preclude its application as a defendant's doctrine: "This opinion in no way affects the long line of jurisprudence which holds that certain minor children are incapable of contributory negligence. We do not here set the
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plicable to both parties, plaintiff and defendant are, in a sense, equally
"innocent" and should be considered legally equally at fault. The parent-child relationship, however, is one strongly fostered by society and
children are additionally afforded special protection by the law. One
form of that protection, the heightened standard of care to which the
jurisprudence holds tort defendants with respect to children,46 probably
supports the premise that only under very aggravated circumstances
would the courts find fault in the parent-victim through a legal presumption to defeat his portion of the requested recovery. Moreover, the connot have constituted fault
duct of the children in Babin and Vidrine may
47
even when measured by an adult standard.
standard of care to which a victim is subject with regard to such a nondiscerning person."
308 So. 2d at 277. The import of these two sentences is far from clear. It is not surprising
that Turner does not change the legal capacity of children for contributory negligence,
since it in no way alters their capacity for primary negligence. Turner's holding does not
change either the standard of care or the liability of a nondiscerning child; it merely places
a heavier duty on that child's parent. Nor does the ruling in Deshotel v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971), preclude use of presumed fault as a defendant's
doctrine. Deshotel held that the negligence of a child was not imputed to the father to bar
the father's personal injury claim against his insurer based on the negligence of his son.
The case is inapposite to the speculated use of article 2318 here, since there is no negligence
on the part of the child and the only possible plaintiff fault at issue is presumed fault on the
part of the father. Deshotel rests on a pre-Turner understanding of article 2318 which
continues to be viable only with respect to the negligent acts of minor children-ie., that
"[alrticle 2318 does not create negligence in the father because of the minor's negligent acts;
it merely attaches financial responsibility to the father for the delicts of his minor child."
243 So. 2d at 261. With respect to minor children below the age of discernment and minor
children whose conduct is not negligent, any liability rests on a presumption of fault in the
parent (due to the unreasonable risk created by the child) and imputation of fault is not at
issue. Language in a footnote in Deshotel is also supportive of the distinction between the
parent as plaintiff for recovery of his losses and as plaintiff seeking recovery for the benefit
of the minor. The footnote clarifies the court's holding by stating that "[t]his suit does not
involve a claim for a debt which would inure to the benefit of the negligent child, such as a
debt for that child's medical expenses for which the father is responsible. In such a case
we might be concerned with derivative negligence rather than with imputed negligence."
243 So. 2d at 261 n.3.
46. For example, the attractive nuisance doctrine places a special duty on property
owners with respect to certain artificial conditions or dangerous activities if the presence of
young children can be expected. Comment, The Attractive NuisanceDoctrine in Louisiana,
10 LA. L. REV. 469 (1950). Likewise, in Louisiana and many other jurisdictions, motorists
have a heightened standard of care when the presence of children is evident in the vicinity
of the street. Maus v. Schouest, 342 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 283(A), 339, 343(B), 369 (1966).
47. In Babin, for example, the conduct pleaded as victim fault was pulling the dog's
tail. While such an act by an adult might be considered both undesirable and rude behavior, it might not, under the circumstances, be either negligence or any other form of fault.
The testimony at trial adequately portrayed the offending "Spot" as gentle, accustomed to
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The cases thus far decided on the victim fault issue are most consistent and best explained in terms of their undercurrent of policy notions.
Similar policy considerations are inherent in the dog bite statutes in the
states which have repudiated the "one free bite" rule to impose liability
in the Holland sort of situation. 48 It is instructive that those statutes do
not permit "mere negligence" of the plaintiff to exculpate the dog owner,
49
although assumption of risk and unlawful acts of the plaintiff will.
They also restrict the imposition of strict liability in some circumstances-for example, one who keeps a dog enclosed or fettered on his
own premises will not be liable to an interloper whose presence and exposure to the dog he has no reason to anticipate.5 0
The writ denials in several of these recent animal liability decisions
indicate that the lower courts are frequently reaching appropriate results,
whether or not the supreme court would endorse their rationales. It is
reasonable to conclude, then, that under certain circumstances negligence of the victim will exonerate the strict liability defendant. This will
be more likely when the injury or damage occurs on defendant's own
property. Again, recovery would almost certainly be barred if unlawful
conduct of the plaintiff contributed causally to his harm. When assumption of risk is clearly indicated, as in employment situations, injuries
which are reasonably within the risk assumed will normally be excluded
from the scope of defendant's liability. While no case has yet so held,
presumed fault presents an additional possibility of victim fault.
ParentalLiability Under Article 2318
Negligence and Related Conduct
There is specific language in the Turner opinion bearing upon what
conduct may defeat a plaintiff's cause of action, with special reference to
children (defendant had six of his own) and having no prior history of causing injury. His
violent reaction was not foreseeable, and tort law has normally required only reasonable
prudence and interest in one's own safety, not dignity and courtesy, of the tort plaintiff.
48. ALA. CODE tit. 3, §§ 6-1, 6-2, 6-3; Aiz. REV. STAT. § 24-521; CAL. CIV. CODE §
3342; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.01, 767.04 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 8, § 366 (SmithHurd); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-5-12-1 (Bums); IOWA CODE ANN. § 351.28 (West); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 258.275 (Baldwin); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 3651; MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 140,
§ 155 (Michie/Law Co-op); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12.544; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22
(West); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17.409; NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-601; N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 466.19; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (Page); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 42.1
(West); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-13-16; UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-1-1; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
16.08.040; W. VA. CODE § 19-20-13; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (West).
49. 3A C.J.S. Animals §§ 187, 201 (1973).
50. Id. at § 189.
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negligence as victim fault. Justice Barham narrows his holding with the
statement that it is "limited to a situation such as the one before us where
the victim is unwarned and unsuspecting of any impending harm from
the acts of the child." 51 The limitation may possibly be taken as an
indication that some lesser degree of victim fault will exculpate the strict
liability defendant under article 2318 than would suffice under articles
2321 and 2317. Sound policy would support such a distinction. It is
noteworthy, for example, that Louisiana stands alone in American jurisdictions in holding parents liable for the non-tortious conduct of a
child. 52 Other jurisdictions, in fact, do not hold parents liable even for
ordinary negligence of a child but require intentional or "wanton and
wilful" conduct before liability attaches. 53 In contrast, at least some applications of the law announced in Holland and Loescher have counterparts in the remaining states of the union. 54 Further, parenthood is a
valued relationship which society will avoid penalizing except in the face
of stronger countervailing societal values (e.g., compensation of an innocent victim, with perhaps an even greater degree of innocence required
here than in other situations); ownership (or custodianship) of animals or
property is protected and valued but with lesser societal priority.
The characterization of the innocent victim as "unwarned" as well
as "unsuspecting" indicates that victim fault under Turner may include
much conduct classifiable as contributory negligence. Presumably a victim can be warned by some visible or audible human communication or
by something reasonably communicative about a situation (e.g., a child
barreling toward one on a tricycle, within one's line of vision, is communicative of risk whether or not any warnings are verbalized). A victim's
failure actually to perceive a warning-so that he continues to be unsuspecting, even though warned-would seem to be irrelevant, if a person
of normal attentiveness would have seen or heard it. Although victim
fault under Turner would overlap with the contributory negligence defense, perfect congruence between the two concepts cannot be assumed.
51. 308 So. 2d at 277. One might query whether this language in Turner is applicable
to the victim fault defense under 2317 and 2321 as well-for example, as an implied elaboration of the words "innocent victim" which are used in all three cases. Presumably, however, if that was the intent, it would have been manifested in Loescher, which appears to
have made a studied attempt to summarize the prior two allied holdings and relate the
three aspects of codal responsibility.
52. See Kent, Parental Liabilityfor the Torts of Children, 50 CONN. B.J. 452, 465
(1976); 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 130 (1971).
53. Kent, supra note 52, at 465; 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 137 (1971).
54. See, e.g.,
the dog bite statutes cited in note 48, supra.
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Negligence that arises other than by failure to perceive or heed a warning, for example, would not necessarily be victim fault.
The one case in which liability was defeated by victim fault of a
negligent nature involved circumstances in which the element of warning
was clearly present. In Hebert v. United Services Automobile
Association," the plaintiff was injured when she slipped in a puddle of
dishwashing liquid poured on the floor by the two-year-old child of defendant's insured. Mrs. Hebert was a housekeeper whose responsibilities included babysitting with the child while both parents were away at
work. The accident occurred while the plaintiff was alone with the child
and after she had observed him pouring the fluid on another part of the
floor only minutes earlier. The Third Circuit reversed the trial court's
holding of liability on two grounds. It first concluded that Mrs. Hebert's
conduct was "substandard" 56 and fell within the ambit of exculpating
victim fault. Having earlier quoted the language in Turner discussed
above, the court carefully reinforced its result with the alternate holding:
Even if the meaning which we attribute to victim fault in the context
of strict liability under Turner v. Bucher . . .is not precisely that
which was intended by our Supreme Court, in any event, we find
the holding of Turner v. Bucher . . .clearly inapplicable to the instant case because of our finding that plaintiff was warned and sus57
pecting of impending injury.
The result in Hebert conforms with prevailing societal policy and
the above interpretation of particular language in Turner. Its correctness is also supported, at least by implication, by the language of article
2318 which permits the responsible parent recourse (for reimbursement
of damages paid out) against any person with whom he has placed the
child for long term care. 58 The principle of indemnification thus included is an established one in tort law and well within the meaning of
article 2315.59 The import of its restatement in article 2318, therefore,
55. 355 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
56. It is clear that the court considered the substandard conduct to be negligence
though it carefully refrained from calling it such in connection with strict liability. Later
in the opinion, the court curtailed its discussion of other issues, such as a negligence theory
of liability, since "Mrs. Hebert's negligence will bar plaintiffs recovery under any theory."
355 So. 2d at 578.
57. Id.
58. For the text of article 2318, see note 8, supra. The "care of other persons" evidently refers to some sort of permanent or long term "guardianship" since the phrase is
posed disjunctively to residence with the parent. The intent is that the parent not be relieved of primary responsibility for his child by placing him in residence with another.
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 reads in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." The obligation to

1010

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

must be to ensure that this article's assignment of primary liability to the
parent not be viewed as a grant of immunity to the guardian from the
consequences of any fault on his part which contributed to the injury.
In effect, it clarifies that article 2318 does not alter the law of indemnification. Thus, under general principles of tort law, Mrs. Hebert could
have been required to reimburse the parents if a third person had slipped
in the dishwashing liquid. She could also have been liable for reimbursement of her own award, so her recovery may actually be defeated
by the effective equivalent of a process whereby an obligation in her was
created that extinguished by compensation the obligation of her employer.
Assumption of Risk
One case has recognized non-negligent assumption of risk as exculpating victim fault under article 2318. In Thibo v. Aetna Insurance
Co.,60 the plaintiff was employed as a housekeeper whose duties included the care of her employer's strong, hyperactive, three-year-old
mentally retarded son. She suffered back injuries when the child jerked
her, while she was off balance, as she was dressing him. As in Fontenot
v. Soileau,6 1 the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for several months, and her testimony revealed that she had often had to wrestle with and chase the boy. The Third Circuit reversed the trial court's
holding of liability under Turner and held that plaintiffs recovery was
barred by her fault, in assuming the risk, with Fontenot governing. The
court noted that the holding in Turner is limited to the situation where
the victim is unwarned and unsuspecting of impending harm.
The Thibo court's reliance on Fontenot seems well-placed, since in
both cases the assumption of risk was employment-related and the factors to be balanced under article 2318 were similar to those under article
2321. In fact, the language of Turner noticed by the court also strongly
supports the use of assumption of risk as a defense, since plaintiffs experience during her employment would make it nearly impossible for her
to be "unwarned" and "unsuspecting" that she might suffer injury in the
pay a tort claim is damage under article 2315; that action which causes-another to incur
such liability is therefore an act that causes damage within the meaning of article 2315.
The jurisprudence has so held. See, e.g., Bewley Furniture Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 285
So. 2d 216 (La. 1973).
60. 347 So. 2d.20 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 674, (La. 1977) (The
result was "correct" on the facts found by the court of appeal's majority opinion.).
61. See text at note 38, supra.
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precise manner in which this occurred. Likewise, the policy considerations noted above are clearly applicable.
Presumed Fault
A difficult aspect of victim fault within the parental liability situation arises when there are potential presumptions of fault on both sides
of the courtroom. The situation in which two children are playing and
one gets hurt through the interacting acts or omissions of both can hardly
be deemed unusual. Such a case arose in the Third Circuit in 1976, but
was disposed of without reaching the potential victim fault argument.
In Gremillion v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,62 nine-year-old Rob
Gremillion was seriously hurt when hit in the face by a golf club swung
by ten-year-old Kenny Brechtel. The injury occurred when Kenny was
swinging the club on one side of a shop shed and Rob, playing chase
with other children, ran around the side of the building directly into
Kenny's swing. 6 3 The court distinguished Turner as being applicable
only to children below the age of discernment, and found Kenny's father
not liable because Kenny's conduct was not negligent when measured by
the standard of conduct expected of a child of the same age, intelligence
and experience. The holding foreclosed consideration of the victim
fault defense; it has, however, been justly criticized, 64 as it creates a bizarre and intolerable gap in the law by its narrow reading of Turner and
probably does not represent a correct interpretation of the state of parental liability under article 2318.
The court's opinion is no doubt correct in its assessment of Kenny's
conduct as not negligent (and implied assessment of Rob's as also not
negligent). 65 However, if Kenny's conduct had been measured by an
adult standard so that a presumption of fault would attach to his father
(as it probably should have been), it would seem only fair that an allega62. 331 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
63. Testimony was conflicting with respect to the exact conduct of the two children
which led to the injury. The court found that the preponderance of evidence supported
this version of the sequence of events. 331 So. 2d at 132.
64. See, Andrus, supra note 11,at 116; Gremillion v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 334
So. 2d 205 (La. 1976) (Tate, J., dissenting to writ denial): "Although the result may be
correct (in that plaintiff child's own fault may bar recovery), the law announced conflicts
with Civil Code article 2318 and Turner v. Bucher." Id.
65. The holding that Kenny was not negligent was essential to the court's ruling and
obviated the necessity of determining whether Rob had been negligent. However, it is
apparent that the court did not consider Rob's conduct to be negligent either, since it characterized children as "not cognizant of each other's rash, impetuous and careless acts" and
regarded Rob's actions as "evidencing a child's natural failure to anticipate or foresee consequences." 331 So. 2d at 133.
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tion of victim fault be handled in the same manner. Unlike the cases
where dog liability and child liability collide, the protective public policies seem to be poised equally on both sides. Perhaps in this situation
more than any other it will be impossible to justify restricting presumed
66
fault to application as a plaintiffs doctrine.

Because of the traditionally strong public interest in promoting
parenthood and the family as well as the general leniency with which the
law views the misconduct of children, it seems likely that courts will be
more ready to find victim fault in article 2318 cases than in other areas of

strict liability. The few cases in point illustrate that when the victim
fault defense is raised it is well-received by the courts. This broader
ambit for the defensive doctrine does not presuppose, however, that
every instance of contributory victim behavior will exonerate the defendant. It is always possible that under a particular set of circumstances
those especially commanding values which usually favor a defendant
parent will be supportive of the plaintiff as well. Again, the particular

facts of each case will define the scope of the risks for which the defendant may be held liable and will determine whether any particular victim
behavior falls within the protected area.
66. However, it would perhaps seem as unfair to deny totally recovery to the victimfather as it would be to attach full liability to the defendant-father. This type of case
amply illustrates the desirability of applying Louisiana's long suppressed heritage of comparative fault. For discussion of the applicability of the comparative negligence doctrine
in a strict liability action, see Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42
J. AIR LAW & COM. 107 (1976); Firnberg, The Applicability of a ComparativeNegligence
Defense in a Strict ProductsLiability Suit Based on Section 4024 ofthe Restatement of Torts
2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INs. COUNSEL J. 39 (Jan. 1975); Schwartz, Strict Liability
and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974).
The practical equivalent of a comparative negligence type of distribution of losses was
achieved by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in the pre- Turner article 2318 case of Scott
v. Behrman, 273 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). The father claimed the $100 deductible portion of his property damage claim in an accident caused by the concurrent negligence of his son and the other party. The court followed Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259, in holding that the negligence of the son was not to be imputed
to the father to defeat his recovery. However, the father, as the individual with financial
responsibility for the negligent minor son, was held liable for contribution to the other
party for one-half of his own claim. The court declared that "as a practical matter ...
confusion extinguishes that half of the father's personal claim which is owed both by and to
defendant driver." Scott v. Behrtnan, 273 So. 2d at 664-65. Such a circuitous means of
effecting comparative negligence would also be available in an article 2318 strict liability
action if the court chose to apply presumed fault to the plaintiff father and then call that
fault a concurrent cause instead of exculpating victim fault. Though such a use of plaintiff
fault is not mentioned or hinted at in the supreme court strict liability rulings, there is
interesting language in a writ denial that suggests that at least one member of the supreme
court would be hospitable to such an argument. See note 74, infra.
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Liabilityfor a Defective Thing Under Article 2317
Negligence and Related Conduct
Three cases have found victim fault to deny recovery under Civil
Code article 2317 strict liability. In Korver v. City ofBaton Rouge,67 the
plaintiff was injured when she tripped over a crack in the sidewalk at
night. She sued the city and parish for negligent maintenance of the
walk, and the abutting property owner on the basis of Loescher v. Parr.
The trial court found the abutting property owner to have no duty of
maintenance and repair of public walks, and therefore no liability, 68 but
found the parish negligent in maintenance of the walk. Plaintiffs recovery was barred, however, by her contributory negligence. Evidence of
the adequacy of lighting and the obvious nature of the irregularity in the
sidewalk was introduced, as well as testimony indicating that there had
been no similar accidents in that location. The court of appeal affirmed
the holding of contributory negligence and dismissed the alleged liability
of the abutting property owner under Civil Code article 2317 as follows:
"We do not reach this contention in view of our above holding regarding
plaintiffs contributory negligence as Loescher recognizes that liability
can be avoided by a showing that the damage was caused by the fault of
the victim. ' '69 The holding of this case is unenlightening as an application of strict liability law, perhaps partly because that aspect of tort law
arose only as a secondary theory of liability against a secondary defendant. An interesting but undeveloped aspect of the case is whether the
70
considerations that made the sidewalk the source of an "unreasonable"
risk for purposes of holding the parish negligent in its maintenance are
identical to those used in determining the presence of a defect (also defined in terms of unreasonableness of risk) for purposes of strict liability
under article 2317. The constituent elements of "unreasonableness"
would seem to be the same, except that inability to know of or prevent
the risk would not absolve the strict liability defendant, though it would
preclude a finding of negligence. It would logically follow that once
negligence was found against any defendant, the presence of a "defect"
67. 348 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
68. Responsibility of the property owner under a theory of strict liability was not alleged until appeal.
69. 348 So. 2d at 711.
70. Judge Learned Hand in United States Y.Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) referred to three variables as determining the defendant's duty: (1) the
probability of the risk occurring, (2) the gravity of the consequences if it does, and (3) the
burden of adequate precautions. These have come to be seen as traditional considerations
in assessing whether any specific conduct is negligence; certainly the first two are also useful, if not essential, to finding an unreasonable risk for purposes of strict liability.
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would have been amply established against a strict liability co-defendant-since an unreasonable risk would have been requisite to the holding of negligence. However, insofar as different theories of liability are
advanced against different defendants, it is possible that variations in the
applicable social policy (i.e., of each theory with respect to each party)
will expand or constrict the scope of each defendant's duty. The juxtaposition of a private property owner and a political subdivision of the
state as co-defendants in this case may be a good example of a situation
where the policies with respect to the parties could militate toward different outcomes. The policies implicated in applying each theory of liability might likewise lead to divergent conclusions: perhaps it is misleading
to say that knowledge of and ability to prevent a risk are irrelevant to the
determination of strict liability; more accurately, the absence of knowledge or ability to control, while insufficient to assure a judgment for defendant, may cause a subtle re-calibration of the scales upon which the
various interests are weighed. In some, but not all, instances this might
result in a ruling for the defendant where the presence of scienter would
have permitted liability to accrue.
It is understandable that the First Circuit did not choose to adopt a
facially inconsistent holding by calling the same factual situation unreasonably risky for negligence purposes but not unreasonably risky in
terms of a strict liability defect. The court was nevertheless plowing new
ground in calling the plaintiffs simple contributory negligence victim
fault under article 2317. 7 1 A simpler resolution of the strict liability issue appears to have been available in that the court could have conadjoining one's property is not under the
cluded that the sidewalk
72
property owner's guard.
A second case in which contributory negligence constituted victim
fault and barred plaintiffs recovery under article 2317 is American Road
Insurance Co. v. Aontgomery. 73 Mrs. Montgomery was involved in an
intersectional collision when she proceeded in the face of a traffic signal
that showed red and green at the same time. She and the other driver
sued the Highway Department for maintenance of a defective traffic
light, grounding the claim on article 2317 strict liability rather than negligence since there was no evidence of either actual or constructive
71. This is apparently the first appellate case to hold that contributory negligence is
equivalent to victim fault for purposes of exonerating a strict liability defendant under
article 2317. The applicability of contributory negligence as a defense under any of these
strict liability articles is by no means settled law.
72. See F. STONE, supra note 16, at § 328.
73. 354 So.2d 656 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 430 (La. 1978).
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Mrs. Montgomery was sued by the other driver, by his in-

surer for its subrogation claim, and by the Highway Department for indemnity or contribution.
The First Circuit affirmed, holding the Highway Department not
liable for any of the claims, 74 and awarding the other driver and her

insurer recovery against Mrs. Montgomery-all based upon the defendant's negligence in proceeding in the face of the self-contradicting traffic
light. The court first determined, significantly, that the Loescher ruling
was applicable to the Highway Department because the department
"had control or custody or garde of the light, the light had a defect, and
the defect was a cause of damage. '7 5 Further holding that Mrs. Mont-

gomery's negligence was a cause in fact, the court concluded: "We do not
believe that the duty of the Highway Department to Mrs. Montgomery
extended to guarding her against the consequences of her proceeding
when faced with a yellow light, a red light or both a green and a red
light."'76 In order to affirm the trial court's ruling, the appellate court
was necessarily considering defendant's negligence to constitute victim
fault for purposes of her claims and fault of a third person 77 with respect
78
to the claims of the others against the Highway Department.
74. Id. at 658. But see Justice Tate's dissent to denial of writs to the Montgomerys:
"The highway department is solidarily liable because of its concurrent fault under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317." 356 So. 2d at 430. The minority view expressed in this
statement by the author of the Loescher majority opinion is interesting for at least two
reasons. It reveals a willingness to hold a public body strictly liable under article 2317. It
also suggests that conduct arguably sufficient to establish victim fault (or fault of a third
person) could be interpreted, under some circumstances, as only a concurrent cause of the
damage rather than as totally exculpating victim fault-with a resultant distribution of the
burden of damages between two or more persons.
75. 354 So. 2d at 658. But see Gallien v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1127
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), where the court refused to apply article 2317 strict liability to a
gravity drainage district. The court was of the opinion that "until the doctrine of actual or
constructive notice is overruled, it is still the law, despite the theoretical similarity of
Loescher to a case such as the one at bar." Id. at 1131. It found support for this ruling in
the belief that "to impose the Loescher rule on public bodies would have chaotic results
because of their vast operations and the extensive properties owned, supervised, or in their
custody and control." Id.
76. 354 So. 2d at 658-59.
77. Evaluation of the propriety of holding this behavior to be fault of a third person in
order to defeat the other parties' claims against the Highway Department is beyond the
scope of this paper.
78. This is clearly implied but not explicitly stated in the pertinent portion of the
opinion which states:
The owner or custodian of the thing is absolved from liability if he proves that the
harm was caused by the fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an
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It is evident that the court was anxious to absolve the Highway De-

partment of all claims, although it felt constrained to apply the strict
liability of article 2317 under the facts presented. Since it did not feel
free simply to hold strict liability of this sort inapplicable to a public
body, the court was perhaps too eager to embrace the only other avail-

able means of exonerating the Highway Department. It can be questioned whether the defendant's conduct under the circumstances is
properly tagged negligence at all, and, secondarily, whether, if negligence, it is of a sufficient degree and kind to be exculpating victim fault.

The court did not sufficiently analyze the fact that defendant was
stopped at the light, which was red, and only proceeded when, according
to her testimony, she "saw" it turn green. It was established that a defect caused the light to show both red and green at that point. The fail-

ure to discuss the reasonableness of plaintiffs perception and judgment
in the face of this defect is unsatisfactory. There may be a considerable
difference between proceeding in the face of a red/green light which follows a simple red light and proceeding through a red/green light which
is the only signal encountered at that location-a difference based on
79
arguably disparate perceptions.

It might have been possible to show that the dual traffic signal was
not only visible, but also perceivable-that the red light should have
"registered" in the plaintiffs mind. The question would still remain
what would be the judgment of a reasonably prudent person-e.g.,
whether that ideal person would consider the defective signal to mean
"green" in the context in which it occurred. No doubt it would be negli-

gent to proceed without extra caution through any ambiguous signal, but
the nature and degree of such negligence as the basis of both victim and
irresistible force. We have found no authority that this cause must be the sole one. A
quotation from Loescher v. Parr. . .indicates that it need be only a substantial factor.
We find that the negligence of Mrs. Montgomery was a cause in fact.
354 So. 2d at 658.
79. Human visual perception includes selection and interpretation of the vast quantity
of "raw" sensory data received by the eyes. Such selection and interpretation is largely
based on prior experiences and the informational needs of the brain at the time. R. GREGORY, EYE AND BRAIN: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEEING 8, i1, (1969). It is perfectly possible
that Mrs. Montgomery did in fact perceive (not actually see) a change to a plain green light
and that any other driver would have experienced, under those circumstances, the same
perception. The uncountable prior occasions in which a green light followed red with
undeviating predictability and the slight shift in focus that would automatically occur when
the green light became visible would be two factors which could lead one's "senses to be
deceived." To hold one at fault when acting upon deceived perception is substituting strict
liability of the victim for strict liability of a defendant who is custodian of the defective
thing creating the erroneous perception.
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third person fault in this case was given much too casual attention by the
court.
Assumption of Risk

A 1977 Second Circuit case, Richards v. Marlow,8" held plaintiffs
assumption of risk to defeat possible liability of a landowner and lessor
under Civil Code article 2317. Defendant's property included a network
of pipes that had been part of the substructure for a pier. Plaintiff
slipped and injured her mouth when tight-roping a wet pipe with wet
feet. The evidence at trial showed the plaintiff to be a 13-year-old of
above average intelligence who was familiar with the structure and
aware of its potential danger, but confident of her ability to avoid injury.
In handling plaintiffs allegation of fault under article 2317 the court assumed arguendo the defective nature of the structure but found the claim
barred by plaintiffs fault in "voluntarily encountering a known danger.",'
Richardsinvolves the second traditional form of assumption of risk,
one not inferrable from the person's employment but dependent upon
facts which indicate a voluntary encounter with a known risk. The conduct need not be negligent since the plaintiff may be acting perfectly
reasonably in assuming a risk.82 Here the court found plaintiffs conduct also to be contributory negligence (in the course of discussing the
trial court's erroneous application of the attractive nuisance doctrine8 3)
since it constituted an unreasonable assumption of risk-i.e., one which
a reasonably prudent person, applying here a standard adjusted to the
child's age, intelligence and experience, would not make. This case is
not especially helpful in assessing the potential of assumption of
risk/contributory negligence as victim fault since the court eventually
ruled that the pipe structure was not defective for purposes of determining lessor liability under article 2695.84
80. 347 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
81. Id. at 284.
82. Crowe, Anatomy of a Tort, 22 Loy. L. REV. 903, 915 (1976).
83. 347 So. 2d at 283.
84. Id. at 284. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2695 states:
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which
may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have
arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss
should result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to
indemnify him for the same.
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Presumed Fault
There are no reported cases in which presumed fault has been raised
as a defense to strict liability under article 2317. It is easy, however, to
imagine a factual situation in which such an argument would be available to the defendant. The number and variety of things that might be
defective and cause injury, as the limited cases so far illustrate, are myriad and met daily in common experience-sidewalks, streets, cars, traffic
lights, appliances, food products, farm or manufacturing machinery, and
elevators are but a few. It is not unlikely that in some instances the
person injured by these defective things will be a child behaving in a
manner which would have been negligent in an adult. Similarly, the
plaintiff could be the owner of a valuable animal. What, for example,
would the court have ruled if Mr. Parr had lived in rural Louisiana and
his treacherous magnolia tree had felled a prized bull, defectively on the
lam in a closed range area (through no negligence of the plaintiff), rather
than Mr. Loescher's Cadillac? No doubt the resolution of conflicting
fault presumptions will depend heavily on appropriate policy considerations. On occasions when the relevant interests are closely aligned or of
similar weight, the courts may want to re-examine their continued resistance to application of Civil Code article 2323.85
The breadth of the potential application of article 2317 makes generalization about likely boundaries for victim fault in this area almost
impossible. However, some tentative conclusions can be ventured.
It may be factually difficult to find victim fault through such traditional defenses as assumption of risk or contributory negligence when
liability for injury caused by a thing is alleged under article 2317 rather
than 2316. One cannot have a voluntary encounter with full knowledge
of the risks when the defect is latent; likewise, failure to discover and
avoid a harm-producing defect is hardly fault if the defect was not discoverable. Defects of a sufficiently observable nature to permit application of one of these defenses will frequently not present unreasonable
risks by the very fact that they are readily seen and avoided. Thus,
plaintiff would lose on his prima facie case and relieve the court of considering the victim fault defense. Cases not resolved on the defect ques85. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 states: "The damage caused is not always estimated at the
exact value of the thing destroyed *or injured, it may be reduced according to circumstances, if the owner of the thing has exposed it imprudently." This article is one of the
first statutory provisions for what is now called the doctrine of comparative negligence yet
it is not applied by Louisiana courts to apportion damages between a plaintiff and defendant who have each exhibited some fault. Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's
Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945).
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tion might still, in certain circumstances, leave the defendant with the
potential defense of presumed fault on the part of the victim.
One issue that will be largely peculiar to defenses under article 2317
may render the entire victim fault question moot with respect to certain
defendants-the question whether strict liability for defective things applies to public bodies. Presumably the defendant's public or private status is one variable to be weighed with other interests in defining the
scope of defendant's duty; to hold article 2317 strict liability uniformly
inapplicable to public bodies, however, is a resurrection of the rule of
the same attacks that
governmental tort immunity and is vulnerable 8 to
6
have led to widespread abrogation of the rule.
Conclusion
If the cases decided to date give no other guidance, they at least
illustrate two negative points with respect to the victim fault defense: (1)
there will not be uniformity in the conduct necessary to prove the defense under each of the articles; and (2) the defenses applicable to other
actions cannot be adopted in their entirety for the strict liability action.
The victim fault defense must necessarily be viewed as a means of
implementing the policies underlying the Holland, Turner, and Loescher
decisions. In each decision, explicit reference is made to the fairness of
providing recovery to the innocent victim. When the plaintiff is not an
innocent victim, much of the rationale supporting his recovery is lost.
There are instances, however, in which the social policies advanced by
these decisions will impose on the strict liability defendant a duty which
includes protection of a victim who is imprudent or worse.
Much of the victim fault analysis, then, involves a determination of
whether some conduct of the plaintiff has stripped him of his innocence.
Each case, however, also embodies concepts of societally assigned responsibility and, at least with respect to articles 2317 and 2321, a price
paid for benefits derived. Thus the enterprise liability rationale is pertinent, directly or by analogy, to many of these strict liability situations.
In fact, many factors will bear upon the outcome of these cases, some
having greatest relevance to the plaintiffs case (e.g, in showing unreasonable risk, defect, or custody) and some directly concerning the viability of the defendant's answer of victim fault. Among these would be at
least the following: the social priorities attached to the particular relationship upon which the liability is predicated; the degree of moral cul86. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10; Board of Comm. v. Splendour Shipping &
Enterprises Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
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pability, if any, assignable to each party's conduct; the economic ability
of the parties; the economic relationship of the parties to the instrumentality of injury; the severity and likelihood of the risk; the relationship of
the damage incurred to the risk (i e., in a sense, the foreseeability of this
injury had the defect or deficiency been known or expected); the location
of the incident; the voluntariness or deliberateness with which the victim
encounters the risk-creating person or thing; and the voluntariness and
deliberateness with which the defendant permits contact between the victim and the person or thing.87 The victim fault consideration, in which
so many of these concerns play an implicit role, functions largely to express the reasonableness or unreasonableness of risk. In short, it is a
means of defining the scope of defendant's duty.
Such continuous sifting of facts and weighing of interests produces
that unsatisfying uncertainty that is so prevalent in tort law, but the lesson of years of experience with negligence law (as well as the early historical version of strict liability at common law) is that application of
hard and fast rules often leads to unjust results. The inevitable response
is an outbreak of exceptions, ameliorating doctrines and occasional purposive judicial obtuseness in ignoring what is most unambiguously the
applicable "rule of law." A response to the problem in negligence has
been the method of analysis called "duty-risk," '88 which encompasses a
multifactor consideration such as suggested herein. The approach is
characterized by flexibility and a policy-orientation and is not intrinsically restricted to a negligence action. It would appear to be the best
available, if not an ideal, method for handling the victim fault defense in
a strict liability action under articles 2317, 2318, and 2321.
There would really be two duty questions to be asked in analyzing
the plaintiffs allegations and the defendant's answer. The first inquiry
would be whether the duty of the defendant included protection against
the precise type of injury or damage incurred. This relates to Malone's
concept of the "ease of association of the injury with the rule relied
87. Some of these factors are mentioned in Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La.
1067, 1084, 249 So. 2d 133, 140 (1971). See also, Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The
Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and SurvivalActions, 37 LA. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1976),
and Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L. REV. 61, 6869 (1945), for an analysis of victim fault in terms of the defendant's duty in other contexts.
88. The landmark case applying this method of analysis in Louisiana is Hill v. Lundin
& Assoc., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972). The earlier case of Dixie Drive It
Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962), used an
analogous approach in addressing the scope of protection of a statute. In Holland v.
Keaveney, 306 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), the court used a duty-risk analysis in a
strict liability action based on Civil Code articles 667, 669 and 2315.
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upon"8 9 and a negative answer would make it unnecessary to consider
the victim's behavior. In effect, even an innocent victim under such circumstances would not recover. The second duty question would be
whether the duty of the defendant encompassed a plaintiff engaged in
the conduct of the particular victim, since "rules of conduct . ..are
designed to protect some persons under some circumstances ....
Answers to these two questions should permit a satisfactory determination of whether a presumption of fault is to attach to the defendant and
whether it can be rebutted by the plaintiffs conduct. As David Robertson evaluates the advantages of the duty formulation, 9 1 they are
myriad and formidable: (1) As a theory designed to account for and
predict judicial outcomes, it is clearer and infinitely more cogent.
(2) As a vehicle for suggesting the inevitability of human choice, it is
far more honest. (3) As a means of indicating the range of policy
factors that should be considered in reaching judgments of the sort
in question, it is more evocative. ("Evocative," because it is rare
that the duty formulation will lead to very extensive discussion of
the underlying policy factors; but at least the importance of "policy"
gets mentioned.) (4) In its function of allocating the respective decision-making powers and responsibilities of judge and jury, it
makes more sense.
A fifth advantage might be added-it is adaptable and appropriate to
analysis of the victim's fault under codal strict liability. It in fact permits reliance upon valuable experience in handling negligence-based liability without a clumsy transplanting of doctrines wholly inappropriate
and, in some instances, of limited value even in the context in which they
developed.
Anne T Lastilla
89. Robertson, Reason v. Rule in Louisiana Tort Law- Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin &
Assoc., Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1973). The author uses this phrase to describe the concept advanced by Professor Malone in Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 60 at
73 (1956).
90. Malone, supra note 89, at 73.
91. Robertson, supra note 89, at 14-15.

